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The COVID–19 Pandemic Highlighted the
Need for Mandated ESG Disclosures: Now
What?
Nicholas P. Mack
This is not simply your run–of–the–mill COVID–19 article.
Instead, this article highlights a salient issue that has been right
in front of our eyes this whole time and COVID–19 simply took
our blinders off. ESG—short for environmental, social, and
governance—is gaining significant momentum both at the firm
level and in investment strategy, yet the SEC is trailing behind in
ensuring the market is adequately informed of firms’ ESG
information. It is important to note that the COVID–19 pandemic
initially threw the market into an unanticipated downward spiral;
however, many ESG funds still managed to outperform the market
in the midst of this financial downturn. Why is that and where do
we go from here?
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I.

INTRODUCTION

At the conclusion of 2020, assets under management in sustainable
funds—funds typically characterized by analyses of companies’
nonfinancial environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors—hit a
record high, nearly $1.7 trillion, 1 with Bloomberg forecasting that total
ESG investments may reach $53 trillion by 2025.2 Investments in
sustainable index funds have seen record highs in the first quarter of 2020
despite financial downturn caused by the COVID–19 pandemic.3
Sustainable funds have gained significant traction over the last few years
as US ESG funds outperformed conventional funds in 2019.4 Further,
research conducted during the COVID–19 pandemic suggests that
investing in ESG–focused funds mitigates financial risks, providing for a
safer and perhaps overall better investment opportunity during times of
financial crisis.5 Moreover, companies with robust ESG policies have
demonstrated resilience during the COVID–19–induced financial crisis,

1

Simon Jessop & Elizabeth Howcraft, Sustainable Fund Assets Hit Record $1.7 Trln
in 2020: Morningstar, REUTERS (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/us–
global–funds–sustainable/sustainable–fund–assets–hit–record–1–7–trln–in–2020–
morningstar–idUSKBN29X2NM.
2
Bloomberg Intelligence, ESG Assets May Hit $53 Trillion by 2025, a Third of Global
AUM, BLOOMBERG PROF. SERVS. (Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/
professional/blog/esg–assets–may–hit–53–trillion–by–2025–a–third–of–global–aum/.
3
Pippa Stevens, Sustainable Investing is Set to Surge in the Wake of the Coronavirus
Pandemic, CNBC (June 7, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/07/sustainable–
investing–is–set–to–surge–in–the–wake–of–the–coronavirus–pandemic.html.
4
Jon Hale, Ph.D., CFA, U.S. ESG Funds Outperformed Conventional Funds in 2019,
MORNINGSTAR (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.morningstar.com/articles/973590/us–esg–
funds–outperformed–conventional–funds–in–2019.
5
See UBS Asset Management–Global, How has COVID–19 Impacted ESG Investing?,
UBS, https://www.ubs.com/global/en/asset–management/insights/panorama/mid–year/
2020/covid–19–impacted–esg–investing.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2020) (asserting that
“higher rated ESG funds fared better in the COVID–19 induced market downturn”); see
generally David C. Broadstock, et al., The Role of ESG Performance During Times of
Financial Crisis: Evidence from COVID–19 in China, FIN. RESEARCH. LETTERS (2020)
(finding in the context of the COVID–19 pandemic that ESG performance mitigates
financial risks).
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providing further evidence of the benefits of ESG investing.6 Although
ESG–focused funds and companies with robust ESG policies demonstrate
economic resiliency and potential for outperforming conventional funds,
federal securities laws generally do not require ESG–related disclosures.7
As recently as August 2020, the US Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) showed its reluctancy in mandating ESG disclosures by adopting a
final rule addressing required disclosures under Regulation S–K that was
noticeably silent on ESG–related matters such as human capital and
climate risk.8 This Article will advocate for the SEC to mandate stricter
ESG–related disclosures by public companies, using information gleaned
during the COVID–19–induced financial downturn as the primary support
for such recommendations.
This Article will reference ESG in two respects: ESG policies and
ESG investing. ESG policies refer to board– or management–implemented
environmental, social, and governance related practices at a given
company; ESG investing refers to investing in companies based on their
ESG policies. ESG policies and ESG investing, as well as their constituent
elements, are discussed in greater detail below.
Although some directors may think of ESG policies as simply a
façade, investors are urging companies to develop long–term ESG
strategies.9
More
than
50%
of
directors surveyed
in
PricewaterhouseCooper’s 2019 Annual Corporate Directors Survey
designated that they believe institutional investors devote too much
attention to board gender and ethnic/racial diversity and environmental
and sustainability issues.10 However, the surveyed board members’
opinions have had little effect on changing institutional investors’
beliefs.11 Large institutional investors continued to show a keen interest in
ESG–related policies during 2020, declaring that they will hold directors

Comm’r Allison Herren Lee, Regulation S–K and ESG Disclosures: An
Unsustainable Silence, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 26, 2020) https://www.sec.gov/
news/public–statement/lee–regulation–s–k–2020–08–26 [hereinafter Comm’r Lee Public
Statement].
7
See Connor Kuratek, et al., Legal Liability for ESG Disclosures, HARV. L. SCH. F.
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 3, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/03/legal–
liability–for–esg–disclosures/#:~:text=Although%20the%20federal%20securities%20
laws,are%20materially%20misleading%20or%20false
(stating
that
ESG–related
disclosures are not generally required under federal securities laws).
8
Comm’r Lee Public Statement, supra note 6.
9
Governance Insights Center, ESG in the Boardroom: What Directors Need
to Know, PWC’S ESG PULSE, 1, 2 (June 2020).
10
Id. at 3.
11
See id. (describing that large institutional investors are seeking to hold directors
accountable who are not making progress in ESG–related reporting).
6
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accountable through proxy voting for failing to make progress in providing
ESG disclosures.12
Breaking down ESG into its individual factors, each letter represents
various policy efforts that can be taken by a company. Firstly, the
Environmental (E) element of ESG includes policies such as efforts to
prevent the progression of climate change and combatting issues of
resource scarcity through resource efficiency initiatives.13 Secondly,
Social (S) policies address issues such as labor practices, talent
management, product safety, and diversity.14 Lastly, Governance (G)
relates to company management and oversight, addressing subjects such
as board diversity, executive compensation, business ethics, and
leadership accountability.15 As a result, ESG investing will take into
account the preceding factors, as well as many others not listed, when
making investment decisions.
Using the factors just described, investment management firms
typically build their ESG portfolios around three principles: Exclusionary,
Single Theme, or Best in Class.16 Exclusionary ESG funds designate
categories of companies to prohibit from the portfolio; these companies
commonly include weapons manufacturers, tobacco companies, and
casino operators.17 ESG funds can also take a “single theme” approach,
selecting one guiding criterion for investment such as board diversity or
renewable energy efforts.18 Lastly, “Best in Class” funds focus on
investing in companies that lead their sector (e.g., oil & gas,
pharmaceuticals, technology, etc.) in ESG principles, which likely
includes companies that understand the value of ESG principles and
incorporate them as a means of increasing capital and as a long–term
commitment to sustainability.19 In considering the various guiding
principles for ESG funds, it is clear that at their most basic level they all
rely on company information to solidify their investment decisions.
Companies instituting robust ESG policies are not just attractive
investments simply due to their “do good” mentality and positive impact
on society. Involving ESG factors in a companies’ decisions are correlated

12

Id.
Id. at 2.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Wall Street Journal, What Are ESG Funds and Why Are They Under Scrutiny?,
YOUTUBE (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2DgiAIbTuRE.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Eduardo Ascanio Gosling, The importance of the best–in–class approach to
sustainability, MEDIUM (Sept. 4, 2019), https://medium.com/swlh/the–importance–of–the–
best–in–class–approach–to–sustainability–46a28b45004e.
13
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with superior risk–adjusted returns at a securities level, as well.20
Companies with high ESG ratings have lower costs of debt and equity,
signifying that the market views these companies as lower risk than other
companies.21 A lower cost of capital means a company can invest at a
lower cost, allowing it to develop its business and expand its operations
more easily than if the cost of capital were higher.22 In addition, companies
with strong ESG practices see market–based financial outperformance as
compared to other companies with weak or nonexistent ESG practices.23
This market outperformance may be attributed to companies’ ESG
policies allowing for risk reduction, enabling preemption of potential bad
publicity.24 Regardless of what causes the market outperformance,
investors are taking advantage of the apparent anomaly of investing at
lower risk while achieving higher returns—an occasion contrary to the
well–known sentiment “high risk, high returns.”25
The benefits of ESG investing have become increasingly clearer and
more prevalent in recent years, especially with reference to the 2008–09
and 2020 financial crises. However, creation of regulations mandating
ESG disclosures continues to lag despite ESG’s growing popularity.
Currently, much of the ESG disclosures in the United States that do occur
come from voluntary reporting through companies’ annual sustainability
reports.26 While some mandatory disclosure requirements exist for
material ESG impacts and an array of regulatory reporting requirements
under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and by the Environmental
Protection Agency, the current US ESG disclosure framework remains a
mixed bag of unclear requirements.27
ESG investing is at record highs and its superior market performance
is hard to ignore.28 With general investor dissatisfaction with companies’
20

Mark Fulton, Bruce Kahn, & Camilla Sharples, Sustainable Investing: Establishing
Long–Term Value and Performance, DEUTSCHE BANK GRP. at 5 (June 2012) [hereinafter
Deutsche Bank Sustainable Investing].
21
Id.
22
See Brian O’Connell, What Is Cost of Capital and Why Is It Important for Business in
2019, THESTREET (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.thestreet.com/investing/what–is–cost–of–
capital–14814298.
23
Deutsche Bank Sustainable Investing, supra note 20.
24
Societe Generale, How a sustainable approach to business leads to financial
outperformance, CNBC (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/advertorial/2017/11/30/
how–a–sustainable–approach–to–business–leads–to–financial–outperformance.html.
25
Deutsche Bank Sustainable Investing, supra note 20.
26
Virginia Harper Ho, “Comply or Explain” and the Future of Nonfinancial Reporting,
21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 317, 326 (2017).
27
See id. at 323–24 (explaining the mandatory ESG disclosure requirements currently
in place in the United States).
28
Jessop & Howcraft, supra note 1; see generally Deutsche Bank Sustainable Investing,
supra note 20 (providing that ESG investing outperforms the market).
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annual voluntary ESG disclosures due to their inconsistency and non–
comparability, the need for mandatory ESG disclosures is exceedingly
warranted.29 This Article aims to inform US policy by suggesting the
adoption of certain SEC–mandated ESG disclosures. Part II of this Article
will provide a background on the role of SEC disclosures, exploring
whether such disclosures are beneficial to investors, and will provide a
deeper analysis of how ESG disclosures are currently regulated in the
United States. Part III will analyze the importance of ESG disclosures and
examine whether investors actually utilize ESG information. Lastly, Part
IV proposes a solution that draws reference to Part II and Part III, therein
recommending certain SEC–mandated ESG disclosures.

II.
A.

DISCLOSURE: GENERALLY AND SPECIFICALLY

The Role of SEC Disclosures

Prior to further discussing ESG disclosures, it is helpful to provide a
foundational understanding of the role of SEC disclosure requirements
generally. The SEC has asserted that “accessible and usable disclosures
are central to the SEC’s mission of protecting investors, maintaining fair,
orderly and efficient markets, and facilitating capital formation.” 30 On its
website, the SEC states that the federal securities laws it oversees are based
on the concepts of fair treatment and access to certain factual information
about investments, which is fundamentally achieved by requiring public
companies to regularly disclose “significant financial and other
information so investors have the timely, accurate, and complete
information they need to make confident and informed decisions about
when or where to invest.”31 Financial information most recognizably takes
the form of company balance sheets and income statements, whereas
“other information” takes the form of information that would be material
to an investor’s investment decisions, which may include certain ESG
factors. Thus, the primary rationale for the SEC’s disclosure regime is the

29

See Thomas L. Riesenberg, Comment, Principles Plus SASB Standards, 50 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10653, 10653 (2020) (citing outreach by the Sustainability Accounting Standards
Board (SASB) to support the claim that investors are dissatisfied with annual ESG
disclosures in voluntary corporate social responsibility reports).
30
Structured Disclosure at the SEC: History and Rulemaking, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/page/osdhistoryandrulemaking (last updated May 21,
2020).
31
What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about/what–we–
do#section1 (last updated Oct. 15, 2020).

194

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:188

understanding that investors who have the appropriate information can
make rational and informed investment choices.32
Yet, it is important to recognize that SEC disclosures also impact
shareholders’ rights. For example, based on information in a company’s
mandatory disclosures, shareholders may conclude that the board or
management misallocated or misused their invested funds.33 Their rights
as shareholders allow them to hold the board and management accountable
for such actions, among many others.34 Informed by SEC disclosures,
shareholders can exercise their rights to hold the board and management
accountable through voting at shareholder meetings to change the
direction of the company thereby influencing management’s decisions, or
shareholders may choose to sell their stock.35
Conventional wisdom will assert that mandatory disclosures provide
an efficient response to two economic issues, often referred to as market
failures: (1) agency costs and (2) the underproduction of information. 36
“Agency costs” refers to the issue that corporate managers may steal from
the company or pay themselves excessively high wages, which would
likely go unreported in a voluntary disclosure regime.37 Mandatory
disclosures solve this issue by deterring that type of behavior under the
premise that “bad” acts will be publicly disclosed.38 “Underproduction of
information” is exactly what it sounds like—companies failing to
adequately provide information relevant to investors, which would likely
be the case in a voluntary disclosure regime.39 Likewise, the mandatory
disclosure regime remedies this problem by requiring public companies to
share various kinds of information that is often relevant to investor
decision–making.40
However, conventional wisdom’s persistent theory of the benefits of
mandatory disclosures has not gone without its criticisms. In addition to
arguments advocating for mandatory disclosures, there are also arguments
dismissing the need for mandatory disclosures, calling into question the

32

Daniel M. Gallagher, The Importance of the SEC Disclosure Regime, HARV. L. SCH.
F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jul. 16, 2013), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/07/16/the–
importance–of–the–sec–disclosure–regime/#1.
33
See id. (describing that shareholders may hold board members and management
accountable for misallocating or misusing funds).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Andrew A. Schwartz, Mandatory Disclosure in Primary Markets, 2019 UTAH L. REV.
1069, 1071 (2020).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 1071–72.
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efficacy of a mandatory disclosure regime.41 Each side of this argument is
explored in more detail below, examining the drawbacks and benefits of
mandatory disclosures in the securities market.

B.
Drawbacks and Benefits to a Mandatory Disclosure
Regime
With arguments on both sides of mandatory disclosure’s efficacy, it is
challenging to determine which theory accurately describes the
effectiveness of mandatory disclosures with regard to ESG factors. This
subpart proceeds by first addressing the drawbacks of mandatory
disclosures, then advances to discussing its benefits.
Perhaps the most evident drawback to mandatory disclosures is the
cost that comes with it. The cost of mandatory disclosures can be seen
through two different occurrences: one is the Initial Public Offering (IPO),
and the other is the ongoing quarterly and annual reporting requirements.42
If a company wishes to sell its securities to the public, it is required under
the Securities Act to register its securities with the SEC, a process that is
costly and can consume roughly 1,200 hours over the span of six months
or more.43 Public companies must pay $109.10 per million dollars to
register their securities with the SEC in 2021, which decreased from the
previous year’s $129.80 per million dollars, but still remains a substantial
cost.44 In addition to the initial registration costs, companies by themselves
are typically unable to compose the in–depth disclosure statement required
by the SEC documenting bonus and profit–sharing agreements and
financial statements from prior years.45 This additional level of disclosure
usually requires companies to expend significant capital on lawyers,
accountants, and underwriters, thereby increasing the price tag of the IPO

41

Compare Omri Ben–Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 647 (2011) (exploring the multiple failures of
mandated disclosures), and Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach
to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2373 (1998) (challenging mandatory
disclosures on theoretical grounds), with Allen Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure
in Securities Regulation Around the World, 2 BROOK. J. CORP, FIN. & COM. L. 81, 81 (2007)
(arguing in multiple contexts the benefits to a mandatory disclosure regime), and
Gallagher, supra note 32 (proclaiming the importance of the SEC’s current mandatory
disclosure regime).
42
Schwartz, supra note 36, at 1069.
43
Id. at 1079.
44
Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Fee Rate Advisory #1 for Fiscal Year 2021
(Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressreleases [choose “Press Releases” from
left; then search in “Search by Headline” for “Fee Rate Advisory #1 for Fiscal Year 2021”;
then follow hyperlink under “August 2020”].
45
Schwartz, supra note 36, at 1079.
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by roughly 10%.46 Naturally, this means that this cost is then assumed by
the investors. Additional disclosures in the IPO framework, such as for
ESG–related activities, would only increase the cost to companies to IPO,
ultimately making the process less attainable to companies wishing to
conduct an IPO and less feasible for investors who will eventually carry
the added disclosure costs.
After a company completes its IPO, it is then subject to multiple
quarterly and annual mandatory disclosures. In contrast to IPO–related
costs, these quarterly and annual reporting requirements are ongoing and
last indefinitely. Not only do companies incur costs for compiling the
requisite information—utilizing human capital, software programs for
adequate data compilation, and outside costs for lawyers and
accountants—they also spend a lot of money determining what disclosures
are actually mandated because they are pulled in multiple directions by
various third–party companies that intend to make this process easier.47
However, this leads to confusion and, consequently, the need for
companies to seek costly legal counsel.48 These high costs effectively
exclude startups and small businesses from going public because they do
not have the capital to sustain such regular expenses.49 Therefore,
enhanced mandatory disclosure in both the primary and secondary
securities markets would generally increase the barriers to entry for
smaller business who cannot afford the burden of disclosure costs.
In addition to mandatory disclosure’s high costs and its inherent nature
of causing barriers to entry, mandated disclosures may be problematic in
and of itself. Roberta Romano, Professor at Yale Law School, goes so far
as to claim that there is little proof supporting the statement that
information would be “underproduced” without mandatory disclosures.50
Professor Romano supports this conclusion by stating that because
companies need capital and investors need information, companies are
incentivized to disclose adequate information in order to successfully
compete in the market for investments.51 This theory dispels the need for
expending high costs on IPOs, quarterly, and annual disclosures as
companies would likely only spend on disclosures what is proportional to
their need for capital and to sustain a competitive edge.
Lastly, a major drawback to mandatory disclosures concerns its
unpredictable scope. When regulators are uncertain of investors’ needs,
46

Id.
See Ben–Shahar & Schneider, supra note 41, at 736 (describing the expense to
disclosers in figuring out what information must be disclosed).
48
Id.
49
Schwartz, supra note 36, at 1069.
50
Romano, supra note 41, at 2373.
51
Id.
47
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mandated disclosure has a tendency to multiply in an attempt to identify
those needs.52 Further, once that need is identified and a disclosure is
mandated to satisfy that need, regulators are then pressured to address new
contingencies as a result of the regulation.53 Thus, mandated disclosures
may facilitate a slippery slope if an identified need is uncertain. This
demonstrates the importance of identifying investors’ needs strictly and
coherently to prevent overregulation and unneeded mandates.
While there are numerous other drawbacks to mandatory disclosures,
the above few are most pertinent to this discussion of ESG disclosures.
There are also many benefits to mandatory disclosures, some of which will
be explored below.
Although high costs and, derivatively, barriers to entry are issues
inherent to a mandatory disclosure regime, evidence suggests that this type
of system may benefit companies financially by reducing cost of capital.54
This is due, in part, to the regime’s impact on the amount of information
held solely by privately informed traders.55 Mandatory disclosures act to
displace information solely held by traders, effectively reducing the high
level of private–information trading.56 Theoretical and empirical research
supports the proposition that significant private–information trading is
related to higher expected returns, and, in turn, implies a higher cost of
capital.57 Therefore, displacing private information through disclosure to
reduce the level of private–information trading may imply a lower cost of
capital.
While mandatory disclosures may pose upfront and systematic costs,
a company’s opportunity to invest in itself at a lower cost is made possible
through the same type of disclosure regime. In addition to mitigating
disclosure costs, a lower cost of capital may provide opportunities to
younger or smaller companies that have fewer internal sources of capital.58
This likely provides that the barrier to entry for younger or smaller
companies with limited sources of capital can be deteriorated by the same
regime that causes the barrier. The mandatory disclosure regime may
mechanize a lower cost of capital, effectively diminishing some of the
drawbacks mentioned above caused by the same regime.
52

Ben–Shahar & Schneider, supra note 41, at 685.
Id.
54
See Ferrell, supra note 41, at 95 (claiming that empirical evidence suggests that a
rigorous disclosure regime allows companies to raise external financing on “favorable
terms”).
55
Id. at 93.
56
Id.
57
See id. at 93–94 (asserting that the empirically–supported association between levels
of private–information trading and expected returns suggests that there is value to a
company to meet demanding disclosure requirements).
58
Id. at 93.
53
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An obvious point is that mandatory disclosures aid in combatting
information underproduction in a market so heavily based on information
consumption.59 Increasing mandatory disclosures—to include, say,
ESG—will provide the impetus to companies to disclose information they
already have access to or could easily collect that would help investors
value their company and other companies in the market.60 Professor
Andrew Schwartz of the University of Colorado suggests that absent
compulsion for companies to this disclose information, companies will be
worse off.61 This point signals that mandatory disclosures not only benefit
the market and investors, but also benefit companies in the market that can
learn from such disclosures.62 In turn, this creates a mutually beneficial
reciprocal relationship among companies in the market.
Mandatory disclosures serve as a cornerstone of the SEC’s mission to
protect investors and maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets.63
Disclosures allow for informed investment decisions and provides the
opportunity to hold boards and management responsible for misfeasance.64
With the growth of ESG policies, investor reliance on ESG information,
and outperformance of ESG funds vis–à–vis non–ESG funds, one may
imagine that mandatory ESG disclosures are becoming just as prevalent.
However, that is not the case.65

C.

ESG Disclosures in the United States

Current US securities laws mandate disclosure of certain
environmental and social information, but the vast majority of ESG
reporting remains largely market–driven.66 Most nonfinancial or ESG
information does not reach investors, regulators, or corporate stakeholders
in a company’s typical annual report or other SEC–mandated filings;
instead, companies typically opt to release a separate, free–standing report
aimed at sustainability and other ESG initiatives.67 Furthermore, these
59

Schwartz, supra note 36, at 1089.
Id.
61
Id. But see Romano, supra note 41, at 2373 (arguing that there is little proof that
information will be underproduced in a market lacking mandated disclosures because
companies are incentivized to disclose information to investors to compete in the market
for investments).
62
See Schwartz, supra note 36, at 1089.
63
Gallagher, supra note 32.
64
Id.
65
See Kuratek, supra note 7 (stating that ESG–related disclosures are not generally
required under federal securities laws).
66
Virginia Harper Ho, Non–Financial Reporting & Corporate Governance: Explaining
American Divergence & Its Implications for Disclosure Reform, ACCT., ECON., & L.: A
CONVIVIUM at 4 (Jul. 2020).
67
Id.
60
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free–standing sustainability reports are almost entirely voluntary.68 Due to
a lack of regulatory guidance from the SEC, various companies’ voluntary
ESG reporting is driven largely by private actors such as the Global
Reporting Initiative (GRI), the Task Force on Climate–related Financial
Disclosure (TFCD), and the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative.69 Uncertainty in the US ESG disclosure framework and lack of
adequate guidance by the SEC has led to law firms picking up the slack by
releasing guidance to clients.70
While few US securities laws mandate disclosure on ESG topics
(which is explored more below), some laws potentially require such
disclosures.71 Potential disclosures include material changes to the
business, certain environmental compliance costs, material legal
proceedings, ESG risks that are material risk factors for the company, and
Management’s Discussion and Analysis of “any known future trends or
uncertainties” that could materially affect the firm’s financial
performance.72 Most of these disclosure requirements focus on materiality,
leaving out nonmaterial, albeit possibly important, ESG information.73 In
addition to the aforementioned disclosure requirements, Item 402(s) of the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) requires disclosure of how a
company’s risk management policies relate to executive compensation,
but only if those policies are “reasonably likely to have a materially
adverse effect on the company” and Item 407 of SOX requires disclosure
of a description of board diversity policies.74 The focus on materiality
evinces a nonfinancial regulatory regime that is principles–based, rather
than rules–based, requiring investors to “trust” companies to act
objectively and precisely when gauging the materiality of numerous
complex ESG issues.75 This causes both uncertainty in reporting
68

Id.
Id.
70
See, e.g., Mark S. Bergman, et al., Client Alert, The U.S. Regulatory Framework for
ESG Disclosures, PAUL WEISS RIFKIND WHARTON & GARRISON LLP (July 31, 2020),
https://www.paulweiss.com/insights/esg–thought–leadership/publications/the–us–
regulatory–framework–for–esg–disclosures?id=37633; Kerry Burke, et al., Some Do’s and
Don’t’s for Voluntary ESG Reporting and Disclosures, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP (June
2, 2020), https://www.cov.com/–/media/files/corporate/publications/2020/06/some–dos–
and–donts–for–voluntary–esg–reporting–and–disclosures.pdf.
71
Ho, supra note 66 at 5.
72
Id.; see also David R. Woodcock, et al., Managing Legal Risks from ESG
Disclosures, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 12, 2019), https://corpgov.law.
harvard.edu/2019/08/12/managing–legal–risks–from–esg–disclosures/ (explaining
that, ”the current disclosure requirement for ESG issues under the U.S. securities laws thus
hinges on whether the information would be material to a reasonable investor.”).
73
Ho, supra note 66.
74
Id.
75
Comm’r Lee Public Statement, supra note 6.
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requirements on the discloser side and the need for private actors to draw
attention to sustainability issues and enhanced ESG disclosures.
Paired with voluntary and principles–based ESG reporting are a few
“specialized disclosures” relating to social and human rights that are
mandated by the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd–Frank).76 These rules are much more
specific than the principles–based, materiality–focused nonfinancial
disclosures discussed above. Dodd–Frank requires companies to disclose
mine safety policies and government payments by extractive sector firms,
the use of conflict minerals,77 and business activities in Iran.78 However,
these rules have faced backlash from the business community, causing
some to have been invalidated through legal challenges.79
The sparse usefulness and uncertainty of the nonfinancial disclosure
regime, as referred to above, has led to many attempts in the last decade
to reform Regulation S–K to include ESG factors.80 The SEC, directed by
Congress, began a substantive review of the effectiveness of disclosures
under Regulation S–K in 2012.81 In 2016, as part of this review, the SEC
sought public comment relating to the need for improved ESG disclosures
under Regulation S–K.82 This initiative garnered over 25,000 responses
with the overwhelming majority of respondents—over 80 percent—and
nearly all investors favoring the SEC taking new steps to enhance ESG
disclosures in mandated SEC filings.83 Nonetheless, the SEC failed to act
on the responses received in 2016, responses that overwhelmingly
signaled the market’s immense desire for mandated ESG disclosures. 84
Thus, the SEC’s revisions in response to the 2016 public comment largely
ignored ESG disclosures.85

76

Ho, supra note 66.
What are conflict minerals?, RESPONSIBLE MINERAL INITIATIVE, http://www.
responsiblemineralsinitiative.org/about/faq/general–questions/what–are–conflict–
minerals/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2021)(providing that “‘Conflict minerals,’ as defined by US
legislation, currently include the metals tantalum, tin, tungsten and gold, which are the
extracts of the minerals cassiterite, columbite–tantalite and wolframite, respectively.
Downstream companies often refer to the extracts of these minerals as 3TG.”
78
Ho, supra note 66.
79
See id. (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015)) (striking
down portions of the Dodd–Frank rules on conflict minerals disclosure).
80
See id. at 5; see generally Comm’r Lee Public Statement, supra note 6.
81
Ho, supra note 66, at 5.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
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Id.
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As recently as August 26, 2020, the SEC has shown its resistance to
and neglect in adopting mandated ESG disclosures.86 The rule recently
adopted in late August 2020 is, for the most part, silent on important and
incredibly relevant ESG factors.87 This rule comes close to requiring
disclosure of certain aspects of human capital, but SEC Commissioner
Allison Herren Lee fears that the rule leans too far in the principles–based
direction to further any change.88 The August 2020 rule did not expand
disclosure requirements for simple human capital metrics like part–time
versus full–time workforce, workforce expenses, and employee
turnover.89 Moreover, the rule is silent on the increasingly important topics
of climate risk and diversity.90 Despite receiving thousands of comments
seeking mandated disclosures for workplace development, diversity, and
climate risk, in addition to numerous letters explaining why principles–
based disclosures would not produce the information investors need and
what metrics are important to build long–term value for investors, the SEC
has failed to listen and appropriately respond to the market’s concerns and
desires.91
Encouragingly, though, the US federal government has shown a
renewed interest in mandating ESG disclosures in 2021. The push for
enhanced mandated ESG disclosures reached an important milestone in
early 2021 when House democrat Juan Vargas introduced to Congress
H.R. 1187—colloquially known as the ESG Disclosure Simplification
Act.92 This bill, which has already passed the House and sits with the
Senate at the time of writing this Article, would require issuers of
securities to disclose certain ESG factors93 and their connection to the
long–term business strategy of the issuer.94 However, this bill was met
with significant opposition by congressional republicans who denounced
the efficacy of SEC–mandated ESG disclosures, signaling a potentially

See Comm’r Lee Public Statement, supra note 6 (explaining the implications of the
SEC’s adoption of the August 26, 2020 rule regarding non–financial disclosures).
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
See Corporate Governance Improvement and Investor Protection Act, H.R. 1187,
117th Cong. (2021) [hereinafter H.R. 1187].
93
Please note these “certain factors” are to be established by the Sustainable Finance
Advisory Committee created by the bill. Once the Committee establishes the relevant
factors to be disclosed, it will recommend them to the SEC. The SEC will then determine
which ESG factors to mandate issuers to disclose.
94
H.R. 1187, supra note 92.
86
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arduous task to pass this bill into law.95 Nonetheless, although this issue
appears partisan in nature, high–ranking officials at the SEC—an
independent agency that is supposed to be insulated from politics—
support a more robust mandated ESG disclosure regime.
SEC Commissioner Alisson Herren Lee—a vocal opponent of the
SEC’s current mandated ESG disclosure regime96—requested public input
on potential climate disclosures.97 Commissioner Lee’s hope is that public
comments will provide SEC staff with the ability to deliver climate
disclosures that are actually useful to the investing public.98 SEC Chair
Gary Gensler also brought attention to the SEC’s desire to further mandate
ESG disclosures during his testimony before the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.99 Chair Gensler expressed concern
with the numerous funds labeling themselves as “green” or “sustainable”
and has, in response, asked SEC staff to determine methods in which the
SEC can ensure the public has adequate information to understand
investments regarding these funds.100
As a final note on the federal government’s support of mandated ESG
disclosures, President Biden issued an executive order in late May 2021
instructing the Financial Stability Oversight Council, which Chair Gensler
sits, to construct a plan to improve climate risk disclosures and related
ESG factor disclosures.101 This executive order was particularly aimed at
systematizing the executive branch’s efforts to identify financial risks
posed by climate change, with emphasis on its effects on government and
private assets.102
95

See Press Release, United States Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs,
Toomey: Gensler’s Agenda Does Not Appropriately Reflect the Mission of the SEC (Sept.
14, 2021), https://www.banking.senate.gov/newsroom/minority/toomey–genslers–liberal–
agenda–violates–secs–regulatory–role (Senator Pat Toomey claims that mandating “these
political and social issues” are outside the SEC’s scope of expertise); Press Release,
Congressman Doug LaMalfa, LaMalfa Opposes the “Wokeness Report Card” for
Businesses (June 17, 2021), https://lamalfa.house.gov/media–center/press–releases/
lamalfa–opposes–the–wokeness–report–card–for–businesses (Congressman LaMalfa
likens this bill to a “wokeness” report card, stating that it provides democrats the ability to
“use bureaucrats to forcibly collect information that progressive interest groups will use to
publicly harass American companies.”).
96
Comm’r Lee Public Statement, supra note 6.
97
Comm’r Allison Herren Lee, Public Statement, Public Input Welcomed on Climate
Change Disclosures, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 15, 2021).
98
Id.
99
Chair Gary Gensler, Testimony Before the United States Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs (Sept. 14, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/
testimony/gensler–2021–09–14.
100
Id.
101
Climate–Related Financial Risk, 86 Fed. Reg. 27967 (May 20, 2021).
102
See id.

2022]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

203

Because the climate crisis seems to worsen daily103 and with racial
division in the United States reaching a point unseen in decades,104 it is
important now more than ever for the SEC to mandate ESG–factor
disclosures under Regulation S–K. With potential legislation in the
pipeline and numerous facets of the executive branch of the US federal
government rallying behind a more robust ESG disclosure framework,
SEC–mandated ESG disclosures may come to fruition in the very near
future. Part III provides more detailed reasoning on the impetus for such
mandated disclosures and Part IV provides a starting point for the SEC.

D.

ESG Disclosures Globally: A New Way of Thinking

The rise in interest in ESG investing and general sustainability
proliferated the development of a global reporting standards ideology.
International organizations including the GRI and TFCD, among others,
have released standardized sustainability disclosures guidance to aid in
streamlining and effectuating the release of accurate sustainability
information.105 Furthermore, as investors’ use of and desire for more ESG–
related disclosures continues to trend upwards,106 more global reporting
frameworks—such as the International Financial Reporting Standards
Foundation (IFRS)—are focusing on the importance of such
disclosures.107 This subpart, however, only reviews the reporting
103

See generally A Crash Course on Climate Change, 50 Years After the First Earth
Day, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/
19/climate/climate–crash–course–1.html (describing the current climate crisis and issues
the world may face in the upcoming years).
104
See generally Jennifer Rubin, What to do About America’s Great Racial Divide,
WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/11/05/what–
do–do–about–race–big–divider–american–politics/ (describing the racial divide in
America).
105
Ho, supra note 66; see, e.g., GLOB. REPORTING INITIATIVE, CONSOL. SET OF GRI
SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING STANDARDS 2020 (2020) [hereinafter CONSOLIDATED SET OF
GRI SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING STANDARDS]; TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE–RELATED FIN.
DISCLOSURES, FINAL REP.: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE–RELATED
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES (2017).
106
See, e.g., Katanga Johnson, Analysis: Investors Ask U.S. SEC for More ESG
Disclosures as Companies Resist, REUTERS (June 16, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/
business/sustainable–business/investors–ask–us–sec–more–esg–disclosures–companies–
resist–2021–06–16/.
107
See IFRS Foundation Trustees Announce Working Group to Accelerate Convergence
in Global Sustainability Reporting Standards Focused on Enterprise Value, INT’L FIN.
REPORTING STANDARDS FOUND., Mar. 22, 2021. https://www.ifrs.org/news–and–events
/news/2021/03/trustees–announce–working–group/ (announcing the IFRS’s “formation of
a working group to accelerate convergence in global sustainability reporting standards
focused on enterprise value and to undertake technical preparation for a potential
international sustainability reporting standards board under the governance of the IFRS
Foundation.”).
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framework set out by the GRI due to its recent widespread use and
worldwide adoption.108

1. Global Reporting Initiative
The GRI Standards increase accountability and enhances transparency
among companies by helping them understand their own outward
impacts.109 GRI suggests that companies either use the Standards to
prepare a sustainability report in accordance with the Standards or use
selected Standards, or parts therein, to report information for specific
users, such as investors and consumers.110 While encouraging a company
to develop a new sustainability report or overhauling a company’s existing
sustainability report to comply with these Standards would be ideal, the
latter GRI recommendation seems to be more realistic. In the context of
mandated ESG disclosures, the goal is to inform investors. Thus,
companies may be keener on a select few disclosures with an eye toward
keeping investors informed.
The Standards are broken into four categories: Universal Standards,
Economic, Environmental, and Social.111 Each category of disclosures is
further broken down into subcategories addressing discrete topics within
each category.112 Most pertinent to this Article and the solution proposed
in Part IV are the Standards listed in GRI 300 and GRI 400, which discuss
Environmental and Social Standards, respectively.113 The GRI 300
Standards that saliently highlight company operations and profitability are
GRI 302, GRI 305, and GRI 307, suggesting disclosures for Energy
(mostly in terms of usage and efficiency), Emissions, and Environmental

108

Sustainability Reporting is Growing, with GRI the Global Common Language, GLOB.
REPORTING INITIATIVE (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.globalreporting.org/about–gri/news–
center/2020–12–01–sustainability–reporting–is–growing–with–gri–the–global–common–
language/ [hereinafter Sustainability Reporting is Growing] (citing RICHARD THRELFALL,
ET AL., THE TIME HAS COME: THE KPMG SURVEY OF SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 2020
(2020)) (The report “found almost all (96%) of the world’s largest 250 companies (the
G250) report on their sustainability performance. For the N100 – 5,200 companies
comprising the largest 100 firms in 52 countries – 80% do so.” Further, “[a]cross all
companies surveyed, the GRI Standards is the only sustainability reporting framework that
can demonstrate widespread global adoption. Around three–quarters (73%) of the G250
and two–thirds (67%) of the N100 now use GRI.”).
109
How to Use the GRI Standards, GLOB. REPORTING INITIATIVE, https://
www.globalreporting.org/how–to–use–the–gri–standards/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2021).
110
Id.
111
See generally CONSOLIDATED SET OF GRI SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING STANDARDS,
supra note 106.
112
Id.
113
Id.
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Compliance, respectively.114 The GRI 400 Standard that impacts the same
are GRI 405, suggesting disclosures for Diversity and Equal
Opportunity.115
GRI 302 suggests disclosures of energy and fuel consumption within
the company, energy consumption outside the company, energy intensity
(disclosed in a ratio by dividing the absolute energy consumption by the
company–specific metric, which is a factor chosen by the reporting
company), reduction of energy consumption achieved through
conservation and efficiency initiatives and the accompanying standards
and methodologies used, and reductions in energy requirements of
products and services and the accompanying standards and methodologies
used.116
As the climate crisis evolves daily and continues to worsen,117
information on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and other
environmentally harmful emissions has taken the spotlight in recent years.
GRI 305 on Emissions suggests disclosure of direct, energy indirect, and
other indirect GHG emissions. 118 GRI 305 also suggests disclosure of
GHG emissions intensity (disclosed in a ratio by dividing the absolute
GHG emissions by the company–specific metric, which is a factor chosen
by the reporting company)119 and reduction of GHG emissions resulting
from an company’s reduction initiatives and the accompanying standards
and methodologies.120 In addition to GHG emissions, GRI 305 suggests
disclosing emissions of ozone–depleting substances and nitrogen oxides,
sulfur oxides, and other significant air emissions.121

114

See generally GRI 302: ENERGY, GRI SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING STANDARDS 2016
(2016); GRI 305: EMISSIONS, GRI SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING STANDARDS 2016 (2016);
GRI 307: ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE, GRI SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING STANDARDS
2016 (2016); see also generally Witold Henisz, et al., Five Ways That ESG Creates Value,
MCKINSEY & COMPANY (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.mckinsey.com/business–functions/
strategy–and–corporate–finance/our–insights/five–ways–that–esg–creates–value
(discussing the impact of energy usage and efficiency on cost reduction and operating
profits).
115
See generally GRI 405: DIVERSITY AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, GRI SUSTAINABILITY
REPORTING STANDARDS 2016 (2016).
116
GRI 302: ENERGY, GRI SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING STANDARDS 2016 5–12 (2016).
117
See generally CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2021); see also Rebecca Hersher, A
Major Report Warns Climate Change is Accelerating and Humans Must Cut Emissions
Now, NPR (Aug. 9, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/08/09/1025898341/major–report–
warns–climate–change–is–accelerating–and–humans–must–cut–emissions–.
118
GRI 305: EMISSIONS, GRI SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING STANDARDS 2016 7–12 (2016).
119
Id. at 13.
120
Id. at 14.
121
Id. at 15–17.

206

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:188

GRI 307 suggests disclosing significant monetary and non–monetary
sanctions for non–compliance with environmental laws and regulations.122
Compliance with environmental laws and regulations, or lack thereof,
could have significant financial impact on a company. Failing to comply
with such laws and regulations could open a company to costly litigation,
government sanctions, and public defame. Each of these scenarios could
significantly impact an investor’s investment decisions.
In the years leading up to this Article, tensions surrounding race in the
United States has reached a tipping point and a rise in positive American
views on ethnic diversity is proliferating.123 GRI 405 suggests disclosing
the percentage of individuals within the company’s governance bodies and
the percentage of employees per employee category (in terms of seniority
level and job function) within the context of gender, age group, and other
indicators where relevant, such as minority and vulnerable groups.124 GRI
405 also recommends disclosing the ratio of basic salary and remuneration
of women to men.125

III.
A.

THE IMPACT AND NECESSITY OF ESG DISCLOSURES

Can ESG Disclosures Make a Difference to Investors?

The majority of ESG funds consistently outperform non–ESG funds
in both times of financial stability and in times of financial crisis. Possibly
linked to ESG funds’ success are their constituent investments126 that
implement robust ESG policies. Such success during market stability and
crisis provides for an attractive investment. However, as discussed above,
it is difficult to understand and analyze the extent of a company’s ESG
122

GRI 307: ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE, GRI SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING
STANDARDS 2016 6 (2016).
123
See Abby Budman, Americans are More Positive About the Long–Term rise in U.S.
Racial and Ethnic Diversity Than in 2016, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 1, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact–tank/2020/10/01/americans–are–more–positive–
about–the–long–term–rise–in–u–s–racial–and–ethnic–diversity–than–in–2016/
(explaining that Americans view more positively the increase in racial and ethnic diversity
in 2020 than in 2016, indicating a trend upwards); see also Justin Worland, America’s Long
Overdue Awakening to Systemic Racism, TIME (June 11, 2020), https://time.com/
5851855/systemic–racism–america/ (highlighting the racial divide in the United States and
Americans’ realization of the systemic issues at play).
124
GRI 405: DIVERSITY AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, GRI SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING
STANDARDS 2016 (2016).
125
Id. at 7.
126
A “constituent investment” is a single stock or company that is part of a larger fund
or index. In this context, the constituent investments are the individual stocks or companies
that comprise an ESG fund.
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policies because the current regulatory framework fails to mandate
coherent disclosures on the matter. Explored below is an analysis of the
financial outperformance of ESG funds versus non–ESG funds in times of
financial stability and crisis. This analysis seeks to convey the significance
of ESG factors in investing, therein providing insight into the importance
of establishing a coherent ESG disclosure regime that will better inform
investors.

1. ESG Performance in Times of Financial Stability
Although the main point of analysis in this Article is to provide
information supporting the resiliency of ESG funds during times of
financial downturn to support mandated disclosures of ESG factors, it is
still important to present facts showing ESG fund outperformance in times
of financial stability to bolster that conclusion.
ESG funds have outperformed non–ESG funds in the years leading up
to the 2020 financial downturn.127 In a statistic reported by financial
services company Morningstar measuring US fund returns in 2019, nearly
two–thirds of ESG funds placed in the top two quartiles.128 Further, only
14% of ESG funds placed in the bottom quartile, evincing a significant
improvement in returns for ESG funds vis–à–vis non–ESG funds.129 These
results are not unique to the United States, either. A study containing a
sample of 745 Europe–based sustainable funds provided the same results;
the majority of the sample outperformed non–ESG funds over one, three,
five, and ten years.130 The Financial Times quotes Storebrand Asset
Management chief executive Jan Erik stating, “ESG factors are not just
‘nice to have’ but drivers of performance.”131 This proposition is supported
by Morningstar’s Jon Hale, who claims that ESG investing provides no
systematic performance penalty, while reducing risk or adding alpha.132
ESG investing has gained traction over the last decade and the
importance of utilizing ESG factors in investment decisions has proven to
drive success. However, the SEC remains resistant to mandating
disclosure of ESG factors, effectively keeping pools of important and
127

Hale, supra note 4.
Id.
129
Id.
130
See Siobhan Riding, Majority of ESG Funds Outperform Wider Market Over 10
Years, FIN. TIMES (June 13, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/733ee6ff–446e–4f8b–
86b2–19ef42da3824 (referencing research conducted by Morningstar).
131
Id.
132
Hale, supra note 4; What is Alpha?, ROBINHOOD (Mar. 11, 2021), https://learn.
robinhood.com/articles/2lwYjCxcvUP4lcqQ3yXrgz/what–is–alpha/ (stating that alpha
is ”a statistical measure of how an investment performs against a given benchmark such as
the S&P 500 index over a selected period of time.”).
128
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accurate information from the market. Funds focusing on sustainability
and ESG factors have shown brilliant success compared to their non–ESG
counterparts during times of financial stability, which is an important
argument for SEC–mandated ESG disclosures. However, that argument is
secondary to ESG fund–outperformance during times of financial crisis,
such as the 2020 financial downturn due to the COVID–19 pandemic.

2. ESG Performance in Times of Financial Crisis
Prior to discussing ESG performance during the COVID–19 pandemic
and financial crisis, an analysis of ESG performance during the previous
financial crisis in 2008–09 is helpful. The term ESG only gained
prominence in 2019 and has become somewhat mainstream in 2020.133
“ESG” was not necessarily prominent during the 2008–09 financial crisis,
evidenced by its sudden rise in popularity and increased attention by
investors. Nonetheless, ESG’s predecessor, Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR), was quite prominent during the earlier crisis.134
ESG and CSR share the objectives of bettering the company and the planet
through various initiatives, but they are implemented in different ways.
CSR typically takes the form of a disconnected department in the
company, whereas ESG is integrated company–wide as a strategic
objective connected to the mission of the company.135 Therefore, CSR can
be thought of as a portion of the overall ethos of ESG, with ESG expanding
CSR’s programming to a company–wide mindset. Thus, financial
performance related to CSR policies may indicate a parallel to ESG
performance.
In the decades leading up to the 2008–09 financial crisis, CSR
dramatically increased in developed economies.136 One benchmark
referenced by Giannarakis and Theotokas in analyzing CSR performance
during a financial crisis is the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC)
principles.137 The UNGC principles focus on corporate sustainability,
referencing fundamental responsibilities in areas such as human rights,

133

See Tine Thygesen, Everyone Is Talking About ESG: What Is It And Why Should It
Matter To You?, FORBES (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tinethygesen/
2019/11/08/everyone–is–talking–about–esgwhat–is–it–and–why–should–it–matter–to–
you/?sh=34429cc532e9 (describing ESG as a “new buzzword in business” in 2019).
134
See id. (claiming that “ESG will likely replace CSR as the corporate vehicle for
positive contribution”).
135
Id.
136
Grigoris Giannarakis & Ioannis Theotokas, The Effect of Financial Crisis in
Corporate Social Responsibility Performance, 3 INT’L J. MKTG. STUD. 1, 6 (2011).
137
Id. at 2–3.

2022]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

209

labor, environment, and anti–corruption.138 Referencing a study conducted
by Arevalo and Aravind in 2010 investigating 271 US members of the
UNGC, Giannarakis and Theotokas state that CSR is a starting point for
improving business operations.139 Further, the study concluded that
companies in the sample that conformed less to the UNGC principles were
more affected by the financial downturn, whereas companies that adopted
the UNGC principles more vigorously were impacted less by the crisis.140
Giannarakis and Theotokas also use companies’ implementation of
GRI Standards as a benchmark to conduct an empirical analysis of CSR
performance during financial downturn.141 GRI—as referenced in Part
II—is an opt–in reporting initiative focusing on companies’ reporting on
operations that impact the economy, environment, and society.142 The
results of their study found that companies certified by the GRI reporting
framework indicated increased CSR performance during the 2008–09
financial crisis.143 Giannarakis and Theotokas even go so far as to declare
“the benefits that may arise by the implementation of CSR strategy and
initiatives are more important than ever before for the companies’
survival.”144 The drivers for such importance to company survival may
derive from the increased trust established by CSR. CSR allows a
company to build and develop their brand name, effectuating a relationship
with consumers and building trust.145 Trust between companies and
stakeholders is incredibly important, with many companies viewing CSR
as an investment to differentiate its company and “redefine the trust
between companies and society.”146 Building trust through CSR policies
proved to be of great importance during the 2008–09 financial crisis. More
than 60% of Americans in late 2008 believed that stricter regulations were
needed to prevent big business from abusing its power, signaling a decline

138

The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, UN GLOB. COMPACT,
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what–is–gc/mission/principles (last visited Dec. 2,
2020).
139
See Giannarakis & Theotokas, supra note 136, at 3 (citing Jorge A. Arevalo & Deepa
Aravind, The Impact of the Crisis on Corporate Responsibility: The Case of UN Global
Compact Participants in the USA, 10 CORP. GOVERNANCE INT’L J. BUS. SOC’Y 406, 406–
20 (2010)).
140
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Id. at 2.
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See generally GLOB. REPORTING INITIATIVE, https://www.globalreporting.org/ (last
visited Dec. 2, 2020) (describing the Global Reporting Initiative’s framework and values).
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Giannarakis & Theotokas, supra note 137, at 2.
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in public confidence in market–based solutions to human problems caused
by the financial crisis.147
The above analysis regarding CSR initiatives’ link to company
performance and the drivers relating to such performance can likely be
imputed onto ESG funds. As ESG’s predecessor, CSR shares much of the
values and initiatives embedded in an ESG ethos. Likewise, ESG
disclosures can be seen as a trust–building mechanism between companies
and the market. Because of its inherent trust–building qualities, ESG
disclosures necessarily support the SEC’s mission to protect investors
while maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets.148
Just as with its predecessor CSR during the 2008–09 financial crisis,
companies that employ robust ESG policies showed resiliency during the
2020 COVID–19–induced financial downturn.149 This phenomenon was
measured earliest in China, immediately following the lockdown in
Wuhan in December 2019. Professors at the Hong Kong Polytechnic
University and Chinese University of Hong Kong performed regression
analyses on returns related to ESG scores provided to various stocks listed
on the CSI 300 Index based on certain environmental, social, and
governance factors.150 Controlling for leverage, book–to–market value,
and firm size, the regression results support a positive and statistically
significant relationship between ESG factors and cumulative stock
returns.151 Furthermore, companies with higher ESG scores, as provided
by the authors, experienced smaller stock price declines during the
COVID–19 pandemic.152 In closing, the authors of this particular study
purport that their research empirically illustrated the idea that ESG
performance is a signal of future stock performance and risk mitigation in
times of crisis.153 Granted that this study utilized data recorded only days
after the Wuhan lockdown and at the advent of financial downturn, the
results speak volumes to the importance of ESG factors in investing.
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Alison Kemper & Roger L. Martin, After the Fall: The Global Financial Crisis as a
Test of Corporate Social Responsibility Theories, 7 EUR. MGMT. REV. 229, 236 (2010).
148
See What We Do, supra note 31 (explaining the SEC’s mission and founding
principles).
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See Broadstock, et al., supra note 5, at 1 (citing Rui A. Albuquerque, et al., Resiliency
of Environmental and Social Stocks: An Analysis of the Exogenous COVID–19 Market
Crash (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 676, 2020),
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What is more is that the results of the above–referenced study are not
distinct to China. Many funds in the United States with an emphasis on
ESG criteria have outperformed the market during the pandemic.154
Although much of this outperformance can be attributed to the technology
stock boom,155 nearly three–quarters of tech CEOs believe it is their
responsibility to ensure their organizations’ ESG policies reflect their
customers’ values, which is an attitude towards increasing ESG
performance.156
While counterarguments to ESG’s efficacy in investing exist, the
reasoning for ESG–heavy companies’ outperformance likely still holds
true.157 It is widely held that handling ESG issues well signals operational
superiority within a company.158 Superior operations attributed to strong
ESG policies within a company can be explained by a multitude of
reasons. For example, ESG aids in cost reduction by managing resources
efficiently and increasing operational acuity; ESG may also enhance a
company’s workforce by helping attract and retain employees while
rallying them behind sustainable initiatives.159 ESG’s internal importance
is only magnified during times of crisis. Typically, in times of crisis,
companies that are better at managing business risk outperform their
lesser–prepared peers.160 The heart of ESG policies is risk management,
providing for high–quality leadership that has the ability to address and
overcome environmental and social disruptions.161 Lastly, companies with
robust ESG policies likely create long–term value by solving
154

Esther Whieldon, et al., ESG Funds Outperform S&P 500 Amid COVID–19, Helped
by Tech Stock Boom, S&P GLOB. MKT. INTEL. (Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.spglobal.com/
marketintelligence/en/news–insights/latest–news–headlines/esg–funds–outperform–s–p–
500–amid–covid–19–helped–by–tech–stock–boom–59850808.
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See The ESG Imperative for Technology Companies, ASSETS KPMG (2020),
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/us/pdf/2020/04/esg–imperative–for–tech–
companies.pdf.
157
See, e.g., Elizabeth Demers, ESG Didn’t Immunize Stocks Against the Covid–19
Market Crash, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 1, 2 (Sept. 8, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/09/08/esg–didnt–immunize–stocks–against–the–
covid–19–market–crash/ (arguing that ESG’s role as a “vaccine against unexpected market
shocks” is overstated).
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See Matthew Nelson, The Importance of Nonfinancial Performance to Investors,
HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 25, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2017/04/25/the–importance–of–nonfinancial–performance–to–investors/ (referencing a
statement by BlackRock’s CEO Larry Fink, echoed by many other investors, stating that
“handling ESG issues well is often a sign of operational excellence at a company.”).
159
See Henisz, et al., supra note 114.
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sustainability–related issues through their products and services.162 This is
made possible by sustainability efforts attracting and retaining customers,
driving revenue growth, and generating lower operating costs.163 A robust
ESG policy can provide value in times of financial stability, financial
crisis, and on a long–term financial horizon.
Global data supports the proposition that companies with robust ESG
policies outperform ESG–lacking companies in times of both financial
stability and financial crisis. While some ESG information must be
disclosed to the public, disclosure of majority of the information is not
mandatory. While companies try their best with annual sustainability
reports, the fact of the matter is that not all public companies release such
a report and not every report contains the data relevant to ESG investment
decision–making.164 The above analysis supports the idea that ESG
information is vital to investment decision–making because of the proven
resiliency of ESG–heavy companies and outperformance in the midst of
financial downturn. Fundamentally, ESG information has proven to be of
significant importance to understanding company operations and of great
usefulness in investment decisions, squarely aligning ESG disclosures
with the SEC’s mission to provide accessible and usable disclosures so
investors can make timely and informed investment decisions.165
However, as recently as August 2020, the SEC has failed to mandate ESG
disclosures on some of the most important ESG factors in the United
States. The next question, then, is would investors utilize ESG information
if it was released?

B.

Investors’ Use of ESG Information

According to management consulting firm McKinsey & Company,
investors and asset owners adjust their investment strategies based on
corporate sustainability disclosures.166 Sustainable investing has also seen
162
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See What We Do, supra note 31 (providing that federal securities laws achieve their
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have the timely, accurate, and complete information they need to make confident and
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History and Rulemaking, supra note 30 (“accessible and usable disclosures are central to
the SEC’s mission of protecting investors, maintaining fair, orderly and efficient markets,
and facilitating capital formation.”).
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That Investors Want, MCKINSEY & COMPANY (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.mckinsey.com/
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a stark increase from $13.3 trillion to $30.7 trillion from 2012 to 2018,
presenting an overwhelming development in investment strategies
towards ESG investing.167 Ernst & Young’s (EY) 2016 report on ESG also
indicates a global trend toward an increased interest in nonfinancial
information by investment professionals.168 EY’s report importantly
provides data suggesting that nonfinancial performance plays a “pivotal
role” in most of the surveyed investors’ decisions, with a “dwindling
percentage” of surveyed investors believing that it is unclear whether
nonfinancial disclosures are material.169 Investors have shown a clear
proclivity towards using ESG information in investment decisions,
exemplifying the need for a regulatory framework dedicated to ESG.
The claims above by private entities are echoed by those in the public
sector, as well. A July 2020 Government Accountability Office report on
ESG disclosures found that most institutional investors seek information
on ESG issues to better understand investment risks.170 SEC
Commissioner Allison Herren Lee stated in response to the Commission’s
passing of a final rule in August 2020, “It has never been more clear that
investors need information regarding, for example, how companies treat
and value their workers, how they prioritize diversity in the face of
profound racial injustice, and how their assets and business models are
exposed to climate risk as the frequency and intensity of climate events
increase.”171 Information, survey results, and public statements coming
from both the private and public sectors recognize the importance of ESG
disclosures and the incessant use of such information by investment
professionals today.

C.

Greenwashing and Its Potential Adversary

Greenwashing is the practice of making one’s company appear to be
doing more to protect the environment than it really is.172 Chairman of the
International Accounting Standards Board, Hans Hoogervorst, warns that
greenwashing is rampant in voluntary sustainability reports published by
and%20investors%20alike,could%20improve%20in%20some%20respects.&text=And%
20many%20investors%20said%20they,and%20engage%20companies%20more%20effec
tively.
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U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO–20–530, PUBLIC COMPANIES: DISCLOSURE
OF ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND G OVERNANCE F ACTORS AND OPTIONS TO ENHANCE T HEM
1, 5 (2020).
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Comm’r Lee Public Statement, supra note 6.
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See Leyla Acaroglu, What is Greenwashing? How to Spot It and Stop it, MEDIUM
(July 8, 2019), https://medium.com/disruptive–design/what–is–greenwashing–how–to–
spot–it–and–stop–it–c44f3d130d5 (quoting Cambridge Dictionary).
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companies.173 This is largely the case due to ESG disclosures being
voluntarily reported; companies can hand pick the information they want
to disclose because sustainability reporting lacks a concrete disclosure
framework.174 The selective nature of ESG reporting opens the door to
misleading or misguided statements that may not accurately represent the
ESG policies or impact of the company. A study into randomly selected
Fortune 250 companies’ sustainability reporting efforts showed that the
majority of the sampled multinational corporations (MNCs) could be
accused of greenwashing due to the lack of detailed quantitative
information regarding the environmental impacts on the MNCs’ supply
chain.175 Greenwashing is rampant with most investors believing that
companies do not disclose ESG risks that could affect their business. 176
These practices may only get worse as the United States’ disposition
towards sustainability strengthens.177
As greenwashing in the United States continues to evolve and become
more sophisticated as time passes,178 companies are realizing that “going
green” and marketing themselves as such can drive profitability. 179 More
specifically, Generation Z—typically understood to be those born after
1996—are more likely to spend their money on companies that are seen as
ethical and sustainable.180 In an attempt to capitalize on this imperative,
companies have turned to exploiting the vagueness of “green”

Jennifer Thompson, ‘Greenwashing is Rampant’, Warns Chief of Global Accounting
Body, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/fbc6e4f7–bd89–3971–af89–
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Environment – But is it Making a Difference?, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 19, 2019), https://
www.pewresearch.org/fact–tank/2019/12/19/americans–say–theyre–changing–behaviors
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terminology.181 This is seen in the United States, where greenwashing can
likely be attributed to the current state of ESG disclosures.182 However,
mandatory disclosure of environmental practices would make it more
difficult for so–called “brown” companies to get away with greenwashing
tactics.183 This would allow for third parties to audit the disclosures,
enabling investors, consumers, and nongovernmental organizations to
compare a company’s communications with reliably–audited information
regarding the company’s environmental practices.184 The idea that
regulatory oversight may diminish the rampancy and development of
greenwashing can be seen most clearly through the lens of the SEC.
A core mission of the SEC is to protect investors by maintaining fair,
orderly, and efficient markets by facilitating capital information.185 Central
to that mission is the Securities Act of 1933, often referred to as the “truth
in securities” law, which prohibits deceit, misrepresentations, and other
fraud in the sale of securities.186 Regulation S–K, the SEC’s nonfinancial
disclosure mandate, comes under the authority of the Securities Act of
1933, extending the prohibition on deceitful statements to the very limited
mandated ESG disclosures. Although federal securities laws currently do
not directly require ESG disclosures, companies may be potentially liable
for material misstatements and omissions in voluntary ESG disclosures
under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.187 However, claims regarding ESG
disclosures brought under these two sections have typically failed.188
Perhaps, if ESG disclosures or sustainability reports were regulated under
the Securities Act of 1933 pursuant to their inclusion under Regulation S–
K, disclosers may be dissuaded from partaking in greenwashing due to
enhanced scrutiny and accountability provided for under an SEC
regulatory regime.
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There are certain drawbacks and benefits to a mandatory disclosure
regime as reviewed above. The same concept is true for the more specific
issue of mandated ESG disclosures. This subpart will briefly discuss these
issues, ultimately concluding that, on balance, mandated ESG disclosures
will result in a net gain.
The pitfalls of mandated ESG disclosures will be realized mostly by
the discloser. Firstly, companies may face enhanced liability face if the
SEC mandates ESG disclosures. To this end, Section 11 of the Securities
Act of 1933 and Rule 10b–5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are
on point. If ESG disclosures are mandated by the SEC, Section 11 of the
Securities Act may pose an issue to disclosers for IPOs and secondary
offerings.189 Section 11 allows investors to hold issuers, officers,
underwriters, and others liable for damages caused by untrue statements
of fact or material omissions of fact contained in registration statements if
an investor can show that the shares were purchased pursuant to the
misleading registration statement.190 In addition, Rule 10b–5 of the
Securities Exchange Act casts a wide net by prohibiting untrue statements
of material facts in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.191
Both of these securities laws place disclosers under enhanced scrutiny,
subjecting them to a likely increase in litigation, increased compliance
costs to ensure no misleading statements or material misstatements of fact
are made, and perhaps criminal sanctions on the individual level.192 This
elevated liability will require disclosers to be exceedingly careful in their
ESG disclosures and necessarily raises a danger to disclosers if their
projected ESG initiatives are not realized—such as a claim to become
carbon neutral in 10 years. Depending on what ESG information is
mandated, such a regime could open the door to requiring statements that
companies may fail to realize in the long run, necessarily exposing them
to a risk of being sued under securities laws.
Secondly, research shows that mandatory nonfinancial disclosures,
such as disclosure of ESG factors, may have a negative impact on ESG
policy–development at the company level due to an increased “box–
189
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ticking” mentality.193 Phrased differently, companies may simply comply
with their obligations under the regulation and not seek to go beyond what
is required. This type of mentality could negatively impact the company,
but it could also extend negatively to society as a whole. Take, for
example, if the SEC were to mandate that at least one individual
identifying as a woman be on a company’s board, or that certain carbon
emissions standards must be met. A company can comply with these
minimum standards, disclose such data, and be done with it. This
fundamentally disparages the purposes of ESG policies, which is to
develop a better workplace and society through company initiatives.
The positive aspects of mandated ESG disclosures not only tip the
scale in favor of such a regime, but also quell the concerns just raised
above. Firstly, while mandatory ESG disclosures may subject disclosers
to increased liability, the other side of the coin provides that companies
will be held accountable for misstatements. Such a regime subjecting
disclosers to higher scrutiny can enhance the quality of disclosed
information by encouraging compliance under threat of litigation. 194 Of
course, this positively impacts the market and investors who rely on
truthful and high–quality information to exact investment decisions. In the
same vein, mandating ESG disclosures will provide investors with more
information that can be utilized to make investment decisions. The
importance of ESG information in investing has been demonstrated
throughout this Article time and time again, supporting the salience of
investors’ knowledge of ESG information. Importantly, ESG disclosures
fall within the SEC’s mission to provide significant and useful information
to investors to allow informed investment decisions.195
Secondly, mandated ESG disclosures may reduce the level of
complacency surrounding CSR efforts in companies that typically ignore
CSR issues.196 Research shows that enhanced nonfinancial disclosure
regulation may lead to a larger increase in the level of CSR activity for
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those companies lacking robust CSR initiatives.197 This is particularly
important in smaller businesses that have put off the opportunity to
develop progressive and sustainable business practices.198 Spurring CSR
activity within a company will positively impact society, company
operations, and likely, in turn, financial performance.199 Lastly, mandated
ESG disclosures may reduce the widespread use of greenwashing tactics
in sustainability reporting, effectively leading to more accurate, realistic,
and truthful ESG information disseminated to the market.200
Although mandating ESG disclosures may increase compliance costs
and expose companies to enhanced liability, it also causes companies to
be more careful and truthful in disclosures. This allows for a better–
informed market and an enhanced opportunity for investors to hold
companies accountable for the information they disclose. Additionally,
while mandating ESG disclosures can lead to a box–ticking mentality,
companies have shown their willingness to innovate and develop
sustainability initiatives even though they have met basic requirements.201
Such a mandate may also lead to the development of CSR initiatives in
businesses that lack sustainability programming or are falling behind in
the current progressive business world. Therefore, while there are some
costs to mandating ESG disclosures, those costs are not only mitigated by
the benefits, they are also justified by the benefits. Thus, mandating ESG
disclosures will have a net gain on companies, the market, and society as
a whole.
Investment funds with a focus on ESG have a history of outperforming
the market in times of financial stability and crisis.202 This financial
outperformance is likely due, in part, to the robust ESG policies employed
by the funds’ constituent investments.203 It is increasingly evident that
ESG–heavy stocks and ESG funds’ demonstrated resiliency and financial
outperformance in the midst of financial downturn. The rise in prominence
of ESG investing and the proven impact of ESG policies on company
performance signals a critical need for accurate mandated disclosures on
197

Id.
See Makoya Kageyama, CSR Challenges and Strategies for Small Businesses, TOKYO
FOUND. POL’Y RES. (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.tkfd.or.jp/en/research/detail.php?id=456
(discussing CSR practices at the small business level and what challenges such businesses
face).
199
See supra Subpart III(A) (analyzing the impact of ESG policies on a company’s
operations and financial performance).
200
See supra Subpart III(C) (discussing greenwashing).
201
See One Year Later, supra note 193 and accompanying text.
202
See Hale, supra note 4 (evincing that ESG funds have outperformed non–ESG funds
in recent years); Whieldon, et al., supra note 154 (providing that ESG funds have
outperformed the S&P 500 during the COVID–19 pandemic).
203
Henisz, et al., supra note 114; Aegon Asset Management, supra note 160.
198

2022]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

219

the matter. This need is only further supported by the market’s desire for
ESG information, with evidence suggesting that investors actively use
ESG information in investment decisions.204 Secondary to the previous
point, but nonetheless important, is the fact that mandated ESG disclosures
may reduce inaccurate or misleading disclosed ESG information. These
arguments are supported by the SEC’s three–part mission to ensure usable
disclosures of significant information that (1) protect investors; (2)
maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and (3) facilitate capital
information.205 Mandating disclosure of ESG information will actively
facilitate information vital to a company’s capital development and
formation, while ensuring a streamlined and orderly disclosure method
that protects investors from otherwise misleading ESG disclosures.

IV.

A MATERIAL APPROACH TO MANDATED ESG DISCLOSURES

This Article cannot suggest a drastic departure from the current SEC
nonfinancial disclosure regime because the SEC so recently neglected to
directly mandate disclosures on important ESG factors.206 The SEC likely
is not regulating ESG disclosures to the extent it could because it cannot
be sure “which, if any, sustainability disclosures are important to an
understanding of a registrant’s business and financial condition . . . .”207
Without departing from the SEC’s current principles–based, materiality–
focused nonfinancial disclosure regime, this Article recommends that the
SEC adopt mandated disclosures for certain ESG factors that materially
impact a company’s operations. This solution addresses the SEC’s
repeated neglect to adopt mandated ESG disclosures by framing such
disclosures in a principles–based manner—thus, conforming to the SEC’s
current nonfinancial disclosure regime. This Article has explored the
importance of ESG policies on a company’s operations and how superior
operations attributable to a robust ESG policy can lead to financial
204
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resiliency and outperformance, highlighting the need for investors to know
this information. In addition, this solution ameliorates the pitfalls of
mandatory disclosures by keeping costs low and limiting unpredictability.
Of course, this proposed solution needs to be distilled to reflect certain
ESG factors that are most salient to company operations and, in turn,
generate value. To avoid overextension of company resources, this
solution suggests that the SEC adopt mandated disclosures for two
important ESG factors that materially impact a company’s operations and
are timely given the state of the United States in 2021: resource efficiency
and diversity, and related matters. After briefly discussing the importance
of these two metrics, this Article recommends that the SEC adopt the
framework set forth in the GRI Standards for such matters due to the
Standards’ global footprint and widespread adoption.208
In the midst of an ongoing climate crisis,209 the saliency of a
company’s efficient use of resources is increasingly prominent.210
Research by McKinsey & Company found that instituting resource
efficiency programming can markedly affect operating profits by reducing
expenses.211 The same research shows a statistically significant correlation
between resource efficiency and financial performance.212 Resource
efficiency fundamentally impacts a company’s operations and generates
value for the company, exemplifying the importance of investors’
knowledge on this issue. This point is only furthered by the current climate
crisis, which is largely dependent on the behaviors of businesses. Thus,
resource efficiency is likely a very important factor for investors to
consider.
To ensure that adequate information on resource efficiency and related
matters is disclosed, the SEC should look to GRI 302, GRI 305, and GRI
307, as discussed above in subpart II.D.1. 213 This global framework easily
lays out the disclosures pertinent to the climate crisis and how companies
are playing a role in it. Respectively, these standards capture energy usage
and efficiency, emissions, and compliance with environmental laws and
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regulations, each of which are related to the ongoing climate crisis and the
efficient use of company resources.214
While the financial crisis has been the key point of this Article, the
United States is also facing a race crisis, which has significantly developed
in the years leading to 2021. Not only is a company’s prioritization of
diversity more important now more than ever, research suggests that
prominent diversity policies can enhance company operations and
generate value.215 A robust diversity practice has proven to improve
company performance and employee retention and engagement. 216
According to a study by well–known research and advisory firm Gartner,
75% of organizations with “frontline decision–making teams reflecting a
diverse and inclusive culture will exceed their financial targets,” with
gender–diverse teams outperforming gender–homogenous teams by 50%
through 2022.217 Moreover, a 2018 study by management consulting firm
Boston Consulting Group yielded a statistically significant correlation
between management team diversity and overall company innovation.218
Companies that reported above–average management diversity also
reported innovation revenue that was 19% higher than companies with
below–average management diversity.219 Lastly, research finds that
morale, culture, and employee engagement thrive in diverse and inclusive
workplaces, effectively improving company operations.220 Workplace
diversity has proven to be an important metric for driving company value
and improving operations. Given the backdrop of the race crisis in
214
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America and the above–discussed research, workplace diversity is very
important for investors to consider.
To ensure that adequate information on diversity within a company is
disclosed, the SEC should look to GRI 405, as discussed above in subpart
II.D.221 This GRI section lays out the disclosures pertinent to diversity
within the context of gender, age, and other factors like underrepresented
groups, as the company deems necessary.222 Additionally, GRI 405
suggests disclosing the ratio of salary and remuneration of women to men,
adding another metric for companies to report their diversity initiatives.223
For each of GRI 302, GRI 305, GRI 307, and GRI 405, due to the
Standards’ growing popularity, the SEC would be adopting a mandate that
much of the of world’s largest companies are already familiar with.224
Although mandated disclosures can carry a substantial cost burden,
this solution likely would not impose unbearable costs on a company.225
Companies likely already record the data necessary to comply with the
suggested mandated disclosures. Until November 4, 2020 when President
Trump formally withdrew from the Paris Climate Accord,226 the private
sector was recognized as an integral part of the global solution to climate
change.227 This is a clear signal for businesses to develop sustainability
measures and aid in the national reporting of greenhouse gas emissions.228
Therefore, a company’s resource efficiency practices were likely recorded
as a result of the United States’ prior obligations under the Paris Climate
Accord. Although the United States withdrew from the Accord under
President Trump’s direction, companies continued to grow and develop
their sustainability practices as if the Paris Climate Accord obligations
were still in place.229 Additionally, President Joe Biden rejoined the
Accord in February 2021, restoring the impetus for companies to record
sustainability measures.230 Moreover, human resources departments
221
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typically record company diversity statistics, making mandatory reporting
easy and cost–effective.231
This solution also mitigates the issue of mandated disclosure’s
unpredictable scope.232 This solution effectively limits unpredictability in
disclosure because of its demonstrated specificity. While some uncertainty
remains with regard to the operational materiality of the suggested
mandated disclosures, the factors of resource efficiency, diversity, and the
few related matters are quite particular and easily recordable. Perhaps, if
the SEC were more open to straightforward nonfinancial disclosures—as
opposed to principles–based nonfinancial disclosures—this solution
would have recommended a more easily recognizable mandate. However,
given the current regulatory framework for nonfinancial disclosures,
recommending a principles–based reporting requirement with very
specific principles seemed to best balance the scale between realistic
implementation and usefulness to investors.

V.

CONCLUSION

It is increasingly evident that a robust ESG policy signals financial
outperformance. This proposition has only gained support due to the
COVID–19–induced financial downturn, where data has shown financial
resiliency and outperformance in companies that employ a robust ESG
policy and funds that are ESG–focused. Research points to ESG’s positive
impact on a company’s operations, causing an ESG–heavy company to be
better suited to handle financial downturn and drastic market changes than
the alternative. In addition, the last few years have seen an incredible
uptick in ESG–based investing and investor use of sustainability
disclosures in investment decisions. However, SEC–mandated ESG
disclosures remain mostly nonexistent, leading to voluntary ESG
disclosures in annual sustainability reports that are subject to
greenwashing and potentially misleading data and reporting.
While it would be most beneficial to investors to suggest a solution
that mandates disclosures of a sweeping list of ESG factors, the SEC, at
least in the near future, likely would not enact such a mandate. Instead, the
most viable solution is one rooted in the SEC’s current principles–based,
materiality–focused nonfinancial reporting regime. Reacting to
scholarship on the negative implications of mandatory disclosures, this
solution seeks to mitigate the costs and unpredictability of mandatory
231
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disclosures by recommending disclosures of information that a company
likely already records while maintaining a level of sufficient specificity.
To that end, the best course of action to inform investors of relevant ESG
information while staying true to the SEC’s mission and current practices
is to mandate disclosures of practices for resource efficiency and diversity
based on the Standards outlined by the Global Reporting Initiative.

